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The Kentucky Felony
Willfil Murder
By Roy MoRELAND*

The 1960 Kentucky Legislature directed the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission to make a study of the homicide law
of Kentucky. The writer participated in that study. As a result
of the study, a statute was offered to the 1962 Legislature defining involuntary manslaughter in the first and in the second
degree.' One of the purposes of this statute was to do away with
the technically impossible Kentucky crime, the negligent voluntary manslaughter. This statute has been incorporated in Kentucky homicide law as Ky. Rev. Stat. 435.022 [hereinafter abbreviated KRS], and it is to be hoped that the courts will interpret
the statute so as to accomplish that purpose.
However, another purpose of the new involuntary manslaughter statute is to do away with another impossible Kentucky
crime, the felony willful murder. This offense, like the negligent
voluntary manslaughter, is on its face a contradition in terms,
since the felony willful murder is an unintentionalhomicide, but
it is fast becoming embedded in Kentucky decision law. The
writer prepared a long paper on the development of the law of
homicide at common law and in Kentucky which appeared as an
article, "Kentucky Homicide Law with Recommendations," 51
Kentucky Law Journal 59 (1962). While that article pointed
out the legal inconsistency in the felony willful murder as well
as in the voluntary negligent manslaughter, the general discussion in the article is phrased largely in terms of negligence. The
new statute itself, KRS 435.022, which was recommended to cure
the situation in bbth instances, is phrased in terms of wantonness
* LL.B., University of Kentucky; J.D., University of Chicago Law School;
SJ.D., Harvard Law School.
' Asinislegislation,
well known, the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission does not
engage
and so did not participate in the introduction or passage of
the bill which resulted in this new involuntary manslaughter statute. It was
introduced in the House by the Hon. Richard Frymire at the request of the writer.
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and recklessness, negligence words. This is because most modem
legal thinking no longer determines liability for unintentional
homicide according to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act
out of which the death occurred, but upon the degree of danger
in it. That being so, the felony-murder, misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrines have merged, and one rule (statute), stated
slaughter doctrines have emerged, and one rule (statute), stated
in terms of negligence, suffices. That one rule in Kentucky is now
KRS 485.022 and it should apply to homicides occurring both in
the commission of unlawful acts and those arising out of criminal
negligence other than in the operation of motor vehicles on the
ordinary negligence level.
And yet a fear remains in the writer that this is not wholly
clear as to the felony willful murder. KRS 435.022 is itself phrased
in terms of negligence. There have been repeated attacks on the
negligent voluntary manslaughter in the periodicals, in addition
to the long article in the 1962 fall issue of the Kentucky Law
Journal, so there should be no doubt that a purpose of the new
statute is to do away with this unfortunate crime. But there has
been little attack, as yet, upon the equally unfortunate felony
willful murder, other than the one in the above issue of the
Law Journal, and it, perhaps, does not urge the use of KRS
435.022 to eliminate this impossible Kentucky crime with sufficient forcefulness and directness to make the matter wholly clear.3
For that reason this short article specifically urging that the new
KRS 435.022 be used to eliminate the Kentucky felony willful
murder is written. The article will trace briefly the development
of the felony murder at common law and in Kentucky, limitations
upon the application of the doctrine in this state, the introduction of the hybrid offense, the felony willful murder, into Kentucky decision law and, finally, show specifically how the new
involuntary manslaughter statute, KRS 435.022, should be interpreted so as to eliminate the offense. Since this paper is intended as supplemental to the one in the 1962 fall issue of the
2

Death Occurring As A Result Of Negligent Operation Of A Motor Vehicle,
Ky. Rev. Stat. 485.025 [hereinafter cited as KRS].
3 Only two pages are devoted in that article to a specific suggestion that KRS
435.022 should cause the elimination of the willful felony murder in Kentucky.
See Moreland, Kentucky Homicide Law With Recommendations, 51 Ky. L.J. 59,
83-85 (1963); id. at 128-124.
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Kentucky Law Journal, that article should be read for a more
extended discussion of many of these matters.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FELoNY MuRDER DOCTRINE

There were four kinds of murder at common law.4 One of
these was the willful (intentional) murder which has been codified in Kentucky law as KRS 435.010. The three unintentional
murders were (1) the negligent murder, (2) the felony murder,
and (8) the unintentional killing of a police officer while in the
execution of his official duties. None of the unintentional common
law murders have been codified in Kentucky. The third category
of unintentional murder has finally passed out of existence,'
absorbed by the negligent murder, the test now being whether
the act causing the homicide was criminally negligent, not
whether the victim was an officer. Consequently such a homicide
would now be prosecuted in Kentucky under KRS 435.022.
The felony murder, the particular subject of this discussion,
was often very harsh in its application. While originally it was
necessary that the felony out of which the homicide arose be
dangerous to life and limb, this early rule was later disregarded
and any felony, regardless of its danger, was sufficient to serve
as a basis for a conviction of murder. But such a harsh rule was
bound to yield in time to social pressure and the historic break
came in 1887 in an open, vitrolic attack upon the doctrine by
Judge Fitzjames Stephen in his History of the Criminal Law of
England,7 in which he called the rule "cruel and, indeed, monstrous." Four years later he incorporated his view in an opinion.
This memorable decision, Regina v. Serni,8 is the basis of the
modem felony murder rule. Judge Stephen held that if a homicide occurred in the commission of a felony it would not be
murder, unless the felony in itself was one dangerous to life and
likely in itself to cause death.
4 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 80-81 (1883).

5
Hall, The Substantive Law of Crires-1887-1936,50 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 642
(1987).
6 At one time a killing occurring in the commission of any unlawful act, a
misdemeanor or even a civil wrong, was murder. Moreland, The Law of Homicide

42 (1952).

7 3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 57-75 (1888).
816 Cox C. C.311 (1887).
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When the felony murder rule is stated in this manner the
question naturally arises as to how dangerous in itself the felony
out of which the homicide arose has to be. The law after a great
deal of searching has gradually adopted the rule that it must
be "extremely dangerous," or to state it in another way "so dangerous as to indicate a wanton disregard for human life and
safety."" However, when the test for the requisite amount of
danger required for the felony is stated in this language it becomes identical with (parallel to) the test applied today as to
the amount of danger required in a negligent murder case.1"
This conception of the felony murder doctrine-that it now
requires such an extremely dangerous felony as to indicate a
wanton disregard for human life and safety-is now being incorporated in quite a number of modem statutes, which make
one who kills while committing a felony guilty under the felony
murder rule only when the felony is arson, rape, robbery, or
burglary-all felonies ordinarily extremely dangerous in themselves to human life and safety.11 Such statutes serve a useful
purpose as transitional devices. When the felony element should
ultimately be removed from the rule, these specific, named,
usually extremely dangerous felonies would no longer be named
and the wording of the negligent murder alone would be used.
Then the affirmative burden would be on the prosecution in each
and every case to show such extreme danger in the act which
caused death as to indicate a wanton disregard for human life
12
and safety and some cases have taken this ultimate position,
as has the new English Homicide Act which abolishes the felony
murder completely"3 and permits the showing of the "requisite
implied malice" to be satisfied by an "extremely dangerous act."
The net result of the discussion up to this point indicates
the complete elimination of the felony murder under the new
9 People v. Goldvarg, 346 II. 398, 178 N.E. 892 (1931) (arson); Williams v.
Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W.2d 891 (1935) (robbery); People v. Pavlic,
227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924) (selling liquor, a statutory felony) (defendant was not convicted).
10 Moreland, A Suggested Homicide Statute For Kentucky, 41 Ky. L.J. 146

(1953).
11 These are the four felonies incorporated in the statutes of some thirteen
states. Moreland, The Law of Homicide 217 (1952).
12 See the cases cited in note 9, supra.
1 Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, see 202 H.L. Deb. 726 (5th ser.
1957).
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English Homicide Act and that decisions and statutes in the
United States have also gone most of the way toward eliminating
the doctrine in this country, merging the felony murder with
the negligent murder and making the test of liability in such
cases depend upon whether the act which caused the death
was so extremely dangerous as to indicate a wanton disregard
for human life and safety.
B. Tim SrruATION As To Tim FELoNY Munim RULE IN KENTucKY
It will now be necessary to go back and trace briefly the development of the felony murder doctrine in Kentucky in order
to show the opportunity now available to use KRS 435.022 to
eliminate the Kentucky felony willful murder.
While there is no statute embodying the felony murder in
Kentucky, the crime survives as a common law offense in this
state. 4 In Commonwealth v. Reddick, 15 decided in 1895, the
accused burglarized and burned a hotel, where he knew people
were living, causing the deaths of three people. The court pointed
out the natural danger in his acts and held that he was guilty of
murder although he may not have intended the killings. Two
later decisions, Williams v. Commonwealth 0 and Marion v.
Commonwealth' 7 subscribe to the felony murder doctrine but
neither opinion is clear as to the requisite degree of danger in
the felony out of which the homicide arose, although in each case
the homicide arose out of a robbery, a felony extremely dangerous under most circumstances. Two other cases complete the
series, Whitfield v. Commonwealth 8 and Simpson v. Commonwealth, 19 which was decided in 1943.
The series of Kentucky cases which involve the common law
felony murder is confusing and uncertain.20 There is some doubt
whether proximate cause is needed to be satisfied and whether
in some cases a felony extremely dangerous to human life and
safety is required. With the situation in this condition, the Ken14 Moreland, A Suggested Homicide Statute For Kentucky, 41 Ky. L.J. 139,
150 (1953).

15 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1020, 83 S.W. 416 (1895).
10258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W.2d 891 (1937).
17 269 Ky. 729, 108 S.W.2d 721 (1937).
18 278 Ky. 111, 128 S.W.2d 208 (1939).

19
293 Ky. 831, 170 S.W.2d 869 (1943).
2
0 See the discussion and authorities cited, Moreland, A Suggested Homicide
Statute For Kentucky, 41 Ky. L.J. 189, 150-152 (1952).
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tucky Legislature in 1950 passed a statute, KRS 431.075, which
limits the punishment for all common law crimes, the punishment for which is not provided by statute, to a maximum of
confinement in the county jail for twelve months or a 5,000 dollar
fine, or both. It would appear that after this 1950 statute, the
only felony murder in Kentucky is common law felony murder,
for which the only punishment is the one provided for by this
statute. But the problem is not as simple as that; Kentucky has
the decision-created felony willful murder, punished under KRS
485.010, which is a willful murder statute.

C.

Tim KENTUCKY FELoNY Wrr.LFur

MURDER

A felony willful murder is, of course, a contradiction in terms,
since the felony murder historically and today in other jurisdictions where its remnants hang on is an unintentional killing,
never a willful homicide. With a principle as firmly established as
that one wonders how-by what means-the Kentucky hybrid
offense wormed its way into Kentucky decision law.
It would be somewhat logical to pick up the offense shortly
after the 1950 statute and argue that the courts were unwilling
to accept the somewhat minor punishment provided by the 1950
statute for homicide arising out of occasional heinous felonies,
such. as rape and armed robbery, and so created the felony
willful murder, which though wrong in theory, reached a good
social result, since it is punishable by death or life imprisonment. A short answer to that argument would appear to be that
the legislature has determined that the only punishment for
unintentional felony murder after 1950 is that provided by KRS
431.075.
At any rate, it is the opinion of the writer that the Kentucky
felony willful murder is not the result of a conscious attempt by
the court to evade what was considered to be too mild a punishment for common law felony murder under KRS 481.075 but
that the decision-created crime was occasioned by errors in indictment framing, in the use of an improper application of "implied malice," and in loose language generally in certain opinions.
An attempt will be made to determine just how the word
"felony" became linked with the word "willful" to constitute
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the present "felony willful" murder. The first Kentucky case
in the Kentucky felony murder series, Reddick v. Commonwealth21 perhaps contains the roots of the present unfortunate
hybrid crime. In that case the accused burned a hotel, where he
knew people were living, causing the deaths of three persons.
The court pointed out the natural danger in his act and held that
he was guilty of murder although he may not have intended the
killings. This is a typical case of felony murder. The indictment,
however, charged that the accused took the life of the deceased
"willfully" by setting fire to the hotel. The court by strained
reasoning satisfied the element of willfulness in the indictment
by saying that a death was a "natural consequence of the act of
setting the hotel on fire." This is over-statement and not in accord
with the reasoning in other jurisdictions. The death was not
"practically certain" to occur,22 which is what is required to
satisfy willfulness. Perhaps here is the seed of the felony willful
murder. The defendant should have been guilty of a felony
murder, but not of willful murder.
The next case in the felony willful murder series, Whitfield
v. Commonwealth,2 3 was almost on all fours with the Reddiclc
case except that the defendant was convicted of willful murder
(not felony willful murder). Once more the defendant killed
the deceased by burning a house. The court held he was properly
held guilty of willful murder "although he may not have intended
or calculated the death of an inmate as a result of burning the
house." And yet the court, relying upon the Reddick case, supra,
held he could be convicted of willful murder because "the death
of an inmate was the natural consequence of the fire." This
case, it is submitted, is clearly in error in holding the defendant
guilty of a willful murder. If the indictment had not been framed
in willful murder, then a common law felony murder conviction
would have been a possibility as in the Reddick case since the
Whit-field case was decided prior to the 1950 statute. The unfortumate language in the Reddick case was seized upon by the
court to justify a conviction of willful murder in Whitfield. If one
burns a house, it is not substantially or practically certain that
2117 Ky. L.
22 Moreland,

Rep. 1020, 83 S.W. 416 (1895).
Law of Homicide 18, and authorities cited (1952).
23 78 Ky. 111, 128 S.W.2d 208 (1939).
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someone will be burned to death24-although it is a very dangerous act.25
A somewhat different technical approach in holding a defendant who had committed a felony murder guilty under the
Kentucky willful murder statute was employed in 1943 in the
case of Simpson v. Commonwealth.26 In that case the accused
conspired to commit a felony and during its commission a person
was killed. The court held that the intent to perpetrate the felony
supplied the element of willfulness requisite for murder under the
statute. The court said, "The intent to perpetrate a different felony
during the commission of which a person is killed, supplies the
elements of malice and intent to murder although the death is
actually against the original intention of the party. Responsibility for the consequence rests
on the initial or contemplated
27
purpose." (Emphasis added. )

Such reasoning is not only wholly fictional but fallacious. This
was a case of felony murder, the killing was unintentional not
willful, and a statement that the intent to commit the felony
supplied the willfulness requisite to satisfy the willful murder
statute is irrational and wholly out of line with the thinking as
to the felony murder in other jurisdictions.
A leading case in the felony willful murder series, and one
particularly illustrative of the kind of errors that have occasioned
the unfortunate crime in Kentucky, is the recent decision in
Tarrence v. Commonwealth, 8 decided in 1953. In that case a
father and son killed a Louisville lawyer, while in the course of
his abduction, a felony. They were tried and convicted in separate trials under KRS 435.010. In attempting to show how the
requisite factor of willfulness in that statute was satisfied, the
court said:
Although the accused may not have had the intention of taking
a life, malice in respect to such homicide may be implied or
24 See authorities cited in note 22, supra.
25 This act is sufficient to satisfy the extreme danger required for the
negligent murder or the felony murder but not the substantial certainty of a
death required for an intentional (willful) murder.
26 293 Ky. 831, 170 S.W.2d 869 (1943).
27 170 S.W.2d at 869.
28265 S.W.2d 40 (1953). See also, generally, Centers v. Commonwealth,
318 S.W.2d 57 (1958). Centers was convicted of murder-apparently of felony
willful murder.
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inferred on the ground that the killing was done while the
person who did the act was engaged in the commission of
some other felony or in an attempt to perpetrate some offense
of that grade. . . . In this jurisdiction the usual form is an
instruction that if the accused committed or attempted to
commit another felony and in doing so killed a person, the
jury should find him guilty of murder. (Emphasis added.) 29
It is unfortunate that the court phrased its reasoning in terms
of "malice." KRS 435.010 is a statutory crime and it is phrased
in terms of "willfulness," not "malice." It is true that all four
kinds of common law murder were phrased in terms of "malice,"
and even of "malice aforethought." But that was common law
murder. This is statutory murder, and the statute uses the term
"willful." It is also true that the "intentional" (willful) murder
was one of the four common law murders by "malice," 0 but that
word of art, ambiguous as it is, has about passed out of existence, and this should be particularly true in Kentucky where
there is but one kind of statutory murder-and that is "willful"
murder.
At any rate, there are two distinct errors in the court's reasoning in the Tarrence case. For the court to say that "malice" (willfulness) can be inferred, to satisfy the Kentucky statute, is an
inaccurate use of the word "inferred." 1 One does not infer a
willful killing from an intention to commit a felony. It is impossible to infer a willful murder from the commission of another
felony. A felony murder is an unintentionalmurder.
It is also error for the court to imply a willful killing from
the commission of the felony. It is true that a common law malice
was implied from the commission of the felony and the accused
became guilty of a felony murder, which was an unintentional
killing. It is quite another thing to imply the willfulness requisite
under KRS 435.010. This is not only a fiction, it is an error.
29 265 S.W.2d. 50 (1953).
30 For Stephen's classic classification of the states of mind requisite for murder
at common law into four categories, see Moreland, Law of Homicide 17n (1952).
31 To infer the express malice requisite for intended murder from certain
circumstances is well known at common law and continues today under intentional
murdpr statutes. See Moreland, Law of Homicide 20 (1952). The deadly weapon
doctrine is an example.
However, it is quite a different thing to infer a willful killing from an intent
to commit a felony. Where a killing occurs in the commission of a felony and it is
unintentional, it is a felony murder, and it is error to infer the intent requisite for
a willful murder under KRS 435.010.
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It may be concluded that the felony willful murder, which on
its face is a contradiction in terms, has some support in Kentucky cases. Its roots, perhaps, reach back as far as 1895 but
there are only a few cases applying the doctrine. However, the
Simpson and Tarrance cases are recent decisions and this points
up the fact that the unfortunate crime should be eliminated
quickly in order that it not become entrenched in Kentucky
decision law.
D. SOLTIrON OF

KENTUCKY FELONY WiLLF L MuRDER PROBLEM

It is submitted that the solution to the elimination of the
felony willful murder lies in a proper interpretation and application of the recent involuntary manslaughter statute, KRS 485.022.
Part of the purpose of that statute, drawn after a long study of
Kentucky homicide law, was the elimination of this crime and
the substitution in its place of the statutory offense of "homicide
arising out of such an extremely dangerous act as to show a
wanton indifference to human life and safety."
As pointed out earlier in this paper, the historic felony murder,
as such, is rapidly passing out of the law. The new English Homicide Act abolishes it completely and permits the "requisite implied malice" to be satisfied by an "extremely dangerous act."32
The American courts are moving rapidly in the same direction.
Following the leadership of Judge Stephens in his decision in
Regina v. Serni,33 courts in the United States have gradually
adopted the rule that to make the actor guilty of murder the
felony out of which the homicide arose must have been "extremely
dangerous," or to state it in another way "so dangerous as to indicate a wanton disregard for human life and safety." However,
when the felony murder rule is stated in this modem manner it is
apparent that the test for the amount of danger requisite for
liability for a felony murder is identical with (parallel to) the
amount of danger required for liability for a negligent murder.
It therefore becomes clear that the felony murder and the negligent murder have merged for all practical purposes today, the
law requiring for liability in each case an act so extremely dan32 Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, see 202 H.L. Deb. 726 (5th
ser. 1957).
3 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887).
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gerous 4as to indicate a wanton disregard for human life and
safety.3
However, to make the point that the felony murder, as such,
is passing out of the law-the trend today being to punish such
homicides as negligent killings if the degree of danger inherent
in the felonious act is sufficiently great-is only a partial solution
of the problem. The question still remains: If these homicides
are not to be punished as felony murders, should they nevertheless be punished as negligent murders? KRS 435.022 (1)
answers that question in the negative; that statute provides that
such killings are not murder but involuntary manslaughter in
the first degree with a punishment of from one to fifteen years.
Those who participated in the group study of Kentucky homicide law gave a great deal of thought as to whether the common
law negligent and felony murders should be re-activated in a
new merged negligent murder statute. But, while both the negligent and felony murders and also the unintentional killing of an
officer in the course of an arrest were all murder historically, the
fact must be faced that the unintentional murder is becoming
increasingly unpopular. In Kentucky the only statutory murder
is the willful murder. It seems that the Kentucky Legislature
made its current position clear when in 1950 it promulgated
KRS 431.075, which makes a prosecution for any of the unintentional common law murders highly improbable because of the
small punishment it provides. That statute indicates that the
Kentucky Legislature considers the unintentional murder to be
an unwise public policy concept today.
It is true that the unintentional murder lingers on in the
statute books of other states. But it is found rarely in the decisions. An examination of the Sixth Decenial Digest of the American Digest System for the ten-year period, 1946-1956, verifies this
conclusion. Compilers of casebooks are still able to find cases
where the accused was convicted of murder in some degree for
an unintentional killing but these decisions are becoming scarcer
and scarcer. Of the five persons who worked upon the Kentucky
homicide study group only one was in favor of incorporating an
34 The new Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute has gone
almost the whole way in merging the felony and negligent murders, requiring the
same type of act for liability in each instance. Model Penal Code See. 201.
2(b) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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unintended murder provision in the suggested act. The other four
favored punishing such offenders under an involuntary manslaughter in the first degree provision with a maximum punishment of fifteen years. Those guilty of a lesser degree of negligence causing death were to be punished as guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the second degree.
This increasing unwillingness to punish unintentional negligent killings as murder is occasioning discussion in legal literature and in the legal periodicals. One of the most exhaustive and
thought-provoking of the recent writings on the matter is an
article by Professor Rex Collings of the University of California
Law School at BerkeleyY5 Professor Collings takes a most negative view of the negligent murder, stating that a number of
distinguished English and American writers have rejected the
offense, citing among others Professors Jerome Hall of the University of Indiana and Herbert Wechsler of Columbia. 3 6 It is
increasingly apparent that scholars, jurists, and juries are of the
opinion that the punishment of murder is too severe for these
unintentional homicides.
And that was the conclusion of those who drew KRS
485.022(1). In the reduction of this unintended homicide to
involuntary manslaughter in the first degree, while a reduction
in severity the offense is still punished by from one to fifteen
years in the penitentiary, a very substantial penalty. The selective
spread given to the jury of from one to fifteen years is wide,
giving them great discretion in adjusting the punishment to the
circumstances of the case. It is to be hoped that the felony willful
murder, an impossible crime since a contradiction in terms, will
now be dropped from Kentucky decision law and that instead
of it the courts will use the new statute to punish for these unintentional homicides.
35 Collings, Negligent Murder-Some Stateside Footnotes to Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Smith, 49 Cal. L. Rev. 254 (1961).
36 Id. at 268.

